1 00:00:02,669 --> 00:00:06,506 NARRATOR: On approach to Raleigh-Durham airport-- 2 00:00:06,573 --> 00:00:08,641 Did we just have a flameout? 3 00:00:08,708 --> 00:00:11,244 NARRATOR: --the pilots decide to abort their landing. 4 00:00:11,311 --> 00:00:12,612 When you have an engine failure, 5 00:00:12,679 --> 00:00:15,882 you lose 80% of your performance. 6 00:00:15,949 --> 00:00:17,884 Let's go missed approach. 7 00:00:17,951 --> 00:00:20,887 NARRATOR: But the plan falls apart. 8 00:00:20,954 --> 00:00:21,921 Lower the nose! 9 00:00:23,256 --> 00:00:24,324 We were going down. 10 00:00:31,131 --> 00:00:36,202 NARRATOR: Only five of the 20 people on board survive. 11 00:00:36,269 --> 00:00:41,574 NTSB investigators are puzzled by the wreckage of flight 3379. 12 00:00:41,641 --> 00:00:45,412 It appears the engines are rotating at full power. 13 00:00:45,478 --> 00:00:47,347 So what went wrong? 14 00:00:47,414 --> 00:00:49,215 NARRATOR: Only by taking a test flight 15 00:00:49,282 --> 00:00:50,884 to the brink of disaster-- 16 00:00:50,950 --> 00:00:52,452 Yawing to the left. 17 00:00:52,652 --> 00:00:56,723 NARRATOR: --will an astonishing sequence of events be revealed. 18 00:00:56,790 --> 00:00:59,192 This airplane had to crash. 19 00:01:03,129 --> 00:01:04,030 Mayday! 20 00:01:04,097 --> 00:01:05,098 Mayday! 21 00:01:07,967 --> 00:01:10,603 Pull up! 22 00:01:28,121 --> 00:01:32,292 NARRATOR: American Eagle flight 3379 approaches Raleigh-Durham 23 00:01:32,358 --> 00:01:33,626 International Airport. 24 00:01:36,229 --> 00:01:37,397 OK. 25 00:01:37,630 --> 00:01:38,865 Can you do the descent checklist, please? 26 00:01:42,335 --> 00:01:43,903 NARRATOR: In the cockpit, Captain 27 00:01:43,970 --> 00:01:46,439 Mike Hillis and first officer Matthew Sailor 28 00:01:46,506 --> 00:01:47,607 prepare for landing. 29 00:01:50,410 --> 00:01:54,314 Altimeter 3031, set, cross-checked. 30 00:01:54,380 --> 00:01:55,849 3031. 31 00:01:55,915 --> 00:01:57,050 Set. 32 00:01:57,116 --> 00:01:58,618 Cross-checked. 33 00:01:58,818 --> 00:02:02,088 These were young pilots just starting off in their career. 34 00:02:02,155 --> 00:02:04,891 They were looking to go work at the major airlines, 35 00:02:04,958 --> 00:02:09,963 where the pay and benefits were substantially better. 36 00:02:10,029 --> 00:02:11,898 NARRATOR: The pilots are flying a Jetstream 37 00:02:11,965 --> 00:02:17,904 3201, a twin turboprop airplane designed for short flights. 38 00:02:17,971 --> 00:02:22,342 It's a workhorse for regional airlines like American Eagle. 39 00:02:22,408 --> 00:02:24,177 DOUG TAUBER: Turboprop engines run more 40 00:02:24,244 --> 00:02:26,446 efficiently at lower altitudes. 41 00:02:26,513 --> 00:02:28,815 They're actually more fuel efficient. 42 00:02:28,882 --> 00:02:32,685 So on these short haul routes, the Jetstream 43 00:02:32,752 --> 00:02:34,454 pretty much fit that market. 44 00:02:36,823 --> 00:02:39,659 NARRATOR: Flight 3379 took off at 6:00 PM 45 00:02:39,726 --> 00:02:42,962 from Greensboro, North Carolina. 46 00:02:43,029 --> 00:02:47,267 It's a 35-minute flight to Raleigh-Durham airport. 47 00:02:47,333 --> 00:02:49,969 Well, folks, at this time, we're about 10.8 miles 48 00:02:50,036 --> 00:02:51,971 from Raleigh-Durham International Airport, 49 00:02:52,038 --> 00:02:53,006 about 5 minutes out. 50 00:02:53,206 --> 00:02:54,741 We're about to begin our approach. 51 00:02:54,807 --> 00:02:56,476 Weather tonight's not very good in Raleigh. 52 00:02:56,543 --> 00:02:59,145 Two-mile visibility because of rain and fog, and the winds 53 00:02:59,212 --> 00:03:01,548 are out of the North at 6 miles an hour. 54 00:03:05,084 --> 00:03:08,588 NARRATOR: There are 18 passengers on board tonight. 55 00:03:08,655 --> 00:03:12,725 Among them, college student Lauren Anderson. 56 00:03:12,792 --> 00:03:14,394 I had been up the night before. 57 00:03:14,460 --> 00:03:15,562 I had stayed up all night. 58 00:03:15,828 --> 00:03:17,163 Pulled an all-nighter, wrote a paper, 59 00:03:17,497 --> 00:03:21,367 and slid it under the door of my English professor that morning. 60 00:03:21,434 --> 00:03:22,669 So I was pretty tired. 61 00:03:22,735 --> 00:03:24,270 It had been a long week of finals. 62 00:03:24,337 --> 00:03:26,072 I was ready to get home. 63 00:03:29,742 --> 00:03:34,480 Eagle fight 3379, reduce to 170, then descend 64 00:03:34,547 --> 00:03:38,318 and maintain 3,000. 65 00:03:38,384 --> 00:03:41,854 NARRATOR: 10 miles from Raleigh-Durham, flight 3379 66 00:03:41,921 --> 00:03:43,890 is cleared to begin its descent. 67 00:03:46,559 --> 00:03:47,994 170 then 3,000. 68 00:03:48,061 --> 00:03:53,900 3379. 69 00:03:53,967 --> 00:03:56,002 NARRATOR: The flight crew reduces engine power. 70 00:04:00,440 --> 00:04:04,277 In a turboprop plane, the engine power and the propeller speed 71 00:04:04,344 --> 00:04:07,814 are controlled separately. 72 00:04:07,880 --> 00:04:10,683 The Jetstream 32 had no autopilot, 73 00:04:10,750 --> 00:04:13,219 so you were always hand flying. 74 00:04:16,022 --> 00:04:19,392 It was one of the most demanding airplanes 75 00:04:19,459 --> 00:04:20,960 on a pilot's flying skills. 76 00:04:23,930 --> 00:04:25,965 NARRATOR: Descending to 3,000 feet, 77 00:04:26,032 --> 00:04:28,167 the crew keeps a close eye on the weather. 78 00:04:32,739 --> 00:04:34,841 When you get a chance, look out your window 79 00:04:34,907 --> 00:04:36,576 and see if you see any of that ice. 80 00:04:39,379 --> 00:04:40,813 Yeah, I was looking out there. 81 00:04:40,880 --> 00:04:42,148 I don't see anything right now. 82 00:04:44,851 --> 00:04:48,087 Icing can be a major threat to an aircraft. 83 00:04:48,154 --> 00:04:50,256 It not only increases the weight of it, 84 00:04:50,323 --> 00:04:55,528 but also spoils the aerodynamics over the wing. 85 00:04:55,595 --> 00:04:58,765 NARRATOR: Icing isn't the only hazard facing the pilots. 86 00:05:01,300 --> 00:05:04,504 Eagle flight 3379, caution wake turbulence. 87 00:05:04,570 --> 00:05:07,206 Your spacing on a 727. 88 00:05:07,273 --> 00:05:10,810 Turn left one niner zero. 89 00:05:10,877 --> 00:05:14,747 NARRATOR: There's a 727 landing ahead of flight 3379, 90 00:05:14,814 --> 00:05:17,750 which creates a potential hazard for the flight crew. 91 00:05:20,019 --> 00:05:23,489 Heavy aircraft tend to generate very strong 92 00:05:23,556 --> 00:05:27,627 horizontal tornadoes, called vortexes, 93 00:05:27,694 --> 00:05:30,596 that come off the wingtips. 94 00:05:30,663 --> 00:05:36,836 If the smaller aircraft has an encounter with wake turbulence, 95 00:05:36,903 --> 00:05:40,707 it could be so powerful that it's beyond the control 96 00:05:40,773 --> 00:05:44,143 of the pilot to counteract it. 97 00:05:44,210 --> 00:05:49,549 NARRATOR: Left one niner zero, 3379. 98 00:05:49,615 --> 00:05:52,351 NARRATOR: For safety, the pilots make a minor adjustment 99 00:05:52,418 --> 00:05:55,221 to their course. 100 00:05:55,288 --> 00:05:58,624 Eagle flight 3379, Raleigh, clear to land. 101 00:05:58,691 --> 00:06:02,261 Wind 010 at 8. 102 00:06:02,328 --> 00:06:06,065 Traffic, 3 and 1/2 mile final, a 727. 103 00:06:06,132 --> 00:06:10,837 Cleared to land 5 left, 3379. 104 00:06:10,903 --> 00:06:13,840 NARRATOR: Once the Boeing 727 touches down, 105 00:06:13,906 --> 00:06:17,009 flight 3379 will be cleared to land. 106 00:06:22,248 --> 00:06:25,785 We didn't anticipate any issues. 107 00:06:25,852 --> 00:06:28,254 It was the same old, same old, I'd say. 108 00:06:28,321 --> 00:06:31,357 I probably had taken that flight three times already that year. 109 00:06:35,394 --> 00:06:38,231 And gear down. 110 00:06:38,297 --> 00:06:41,100 Gear down. 111 00:06:41,167 --> 00:06:44,670 NARRATOR: The pilots configure the pain for landing. 112 00:06:44,737 --> 00:06:45,905 Flaps 20. 113 00:06:48,775 --> 00:06:51,444 Flaps 20. 114 00:06:51,511 --> 00:06:53,780 NARRATOR: Just minutes before touchdown-- 115 00:06:57,617 --> 00:06:59,585 Why is that ignition light on? 116 00:06:59,652 --> 00:07:02,121 Did we just have a flame out? 117 00:07:02,188 --> 00:07:05,658 NARRATOR: The engine ignition light illuminates. 118 00:07:05,725 --> 00:07:08,861 DOUG TAUBER: Seeing the ignition light come on during approach 119 00:07:08,928 --> 00:07:11,731 would typically raise a concern. 120 00:07:11,798 --> 00:07:14,500 If combustion is interrupted for any reason, 121 00:07:14,567 --> 00:07:20,139 it's what pilots call a flameout or an engine failure. 122 00:07:20,206 --> 00:07:23,342 I'm not sure what's going on with it. 123 00:07:23,409 --> 00:07:25,278 NARRATOR: If there is an engine failure, 124 00:07:25,344 --> 00:07:28,881 the pilots need to reconsider landing. 125 00:07:28,948 --> 00:07:30,550 The pilot would have to make the decision 126 00:07:30,616 --> 00:07:34,387 whether to continue the approach, or abort the approach 127 00:07:34,453 --> 00:07:37,023 and see what the problem is. 128 00:07:37,089 --> 00:07:38,057 What you want me to do? 129 00:07:38,124 --> 00:07:40,593 Are you going to continue? 130 00:07:40,660 --> 00:07:41,561 OK, yeah. 131 00:07:41,627 --> 00:07:42,595 I'm going to continue. 132 00:07:42,662 --> 00:07:45,064 Just back me up. 133 00:07:45,131 --> 00:07:49,368 NARRATOR: Captain Hillis decides to land. 134 00:07:49,435 --> 00:07:50,670 All right. 135 00:07:50,736 --> 00:07:52,572 Let's go missed approach. 136 00:07:52,638 --> 00:07:55,174 NARRATOR: But then he reverses his decision. 137 00:07:58,010 --> 00:08:00,313 DOUG TAUBER: A go-around or a missed approach 138 00:08:00,379 --> 00:08:03,783 would have given the pilot more time to run 139 00:08:03,850 --> 00:08:06,185 an engine failure checklist. 140 00:08:06,252 --> 00:08:08,621 When you're on final, you really don't have 141 00:08:08,688 --> 00:08:10,389 that much time to complete it. 142 00:08:13,025 --> 00:08:14,193 Set max power. 143 00:08:16,596 --> 00:08:19,398 NARRATOR: Now, at 1,500 feet, captain Hillis 144 00:08:19,465 --> 00:08:22,301 aborts the landing. 145 00:08:22,368 --> 00:08:24,237 When you have an engine failure, 146 00:08:24,303 --> 00:08:27,673 you not only lost half your power, you 147 00:08:27,740 --> 00:08:32,311 lose 80% of your performance. 148 00:08:32,378 --> 00:08:36,449 NARRATOR: Flight 3379 isn't climbing, 149 00:08:36,515 --> 00:08:38,517 and it's losing speed. 150 00:08:39,752 --> 00:08:41,821 Lower the nose. 151 00:08:41,888 --> 00:08:44,824 Lower the nose! 152 00:08:44,891 --> 00:08:48,861 NARRATOR: At 1,400 feet, the plane is stalling. 153 00:08:51,530 --> 00:08:52,398 You got it? 154 00:08:52,465 --> 00:08:54,000 Yeah. 155 00:08:54,066 --> 00:08:55,501 They're unable to climb. 156 00:08:55,568 --> 00:08:58,304 They're starting to lose directional control 157 00:08:58,371 --> 00:09:01,107 of the aircraft. 158 00:09:01,173 --> 00:09:05,044 NARRATOR: Flight 3379 is turning steadily to the left, 159 00:09:05,111 --> 00:09:06,946 veering further off course. 160 00:09:07,013 --> 00:09:09,982 Lower the nose! 161 00:09:10,049 --> 00:09:12,051 Things are getting bad real fast, 162 00:09:12,118 --> 00:09:15,288 and they're running out of time. 163 00:09:15,354 --> 00:09:17,523 Here! 164 00:09:17,590 --> 00:09:19,358 NARRATOR: Plunging rapidly toward the ground, 165 00:09:19,425 --> 00:09:23,195 the pilots fight to recover their plane. 166 00:09:23,262 --> 00:09:25,865 There's no flight attendant on the plane. 167 00:09:25,932 --> 00:09:28,134 There was a lot of commotion. 168 00:09:28,200 --> 00:09:32,305 You could hear some kind of warning siren. 169 00:09:32,371 --> 00:09:33,773 I was scared. 170 00:09:33,839 --> 00:09:34,974 People were scared. 171 00:09:38,244 --> 00:09:39,245 We knew we were crashing. 172 00:09:39,312 --> 00:09:41,580 I knew we were going down. 173 00:09:48,220 --> 00:09:52,959 I just braced myself, literally putting my hand 174 00:09:53,025 --> 00:09:57,563 and my foot on the seat in front of me. 175 00:10:02,201 --> 00:10:05,738 I had a moment that, OK, I need to survive. 176 00:10:05,805 --> 00:10:07,773 I need to live through this. 177 00:10:29,362 --> 00:10:35,401 When we crashed, I just remember hitting ground very, very fast, 178 00:10:35,468 --> 00:10:37,570 very hard. 179 00:10:37,636 --> 00:10:41,474 NARRATOR: Flight 3379 has just plowed through the dense woods 180 00:10:41,540 --> 00:10:44,410 of North Carolina. 181 00:10:44,477 --> 00:10:46,946 It's now a pile of burning wreckage. 182 00:10:48,848 --> 00:10:53,352 The pain split literally in between my seat and the seat 183 00:10:53,419 --> 00:10:56,288 in front of me. 184 00:10:56,355 --> 00:11:00,426 I can remember taking my seat belt off, and hearing people 185 00:11:00,493 --> 00:11:04,397 moaning, and people screaming. 186 00:11:04,463 --> 00:11:07,066 I couldn't see anything. 187 00:11:07,133 --> 00:11:08,901 I don't know if I lost my contacts, 188 00:11:08,968 --> 00:11:11,637 or I just had fuel in my eyes. 189 00:11:13,973 --> 00:11:20,312 I couldn't walk, but my adrenaline was pumping. 190 00:11:20,379 --> 00:11:23,182 I was in fight-or-flight mode. 191 00:11:23,249 --> 00:11:24,216 My intuition was up. 192 00:11:24,283 --> 00:11:26,619 I had-- I had to survive. 193 00:11:26,685 --> 00:11:29,255 And somehow I got away from the fire. 194 00:11:41,000 --> 00:11:43,069 NARRATOR: Morrisville firefighter, David Farrell, 195 00:11:43,135 --> 00:11:45,538 is one of the first responders on site. 196 00:11:48,274 --> 00:11:49,341 And your heart's racing. 197 00:11:49,575 --> 00:11:52,778 I mean-- you know, you're probably 198 00:11:52,845 --> 00:11:55,581 fixing to encounter one of the worst things you've 199 00:11:55,648 --> 00:11:58,684 ever been in in your life. 200 00:11:58,751 --> 00:12:00,986 And you could see the fire. 201 00:12:01,053 --> 00:12:02,588 Your heart was in your throat. 202 00:12:02,855 --> 00:12:05,825 You know, your adrenaline's pumping, you're scared. 203 00:12:05,891 --> 00:12:10,362 As I got closer to the scene, something called my eye. 204 00:12:11,564 --> 00:12:12,665 And I looked down. 205 00:12:18,871 --> 00:12:22,875 I saw a female pulling herself away from the fire, 206 00:12:22,942 --> 00:12:24,310 and she couldn't move her legs. 207 00:12:28,881 --> 00:12:30,282 He had asked my name. 208 00:12:30,349 --> 00:12:33,652 And I told him I needed to find my suitcase, 209 00:12:33,719 --> 00:12:36,889 and that I needed to get home. 210 00:12:36,956 --> 00:12:38,624 I said, you-- you're going to make it. 211 00:12:41,560 --> 00:12:43,262 You're not going to die on my watch. 212 00:12:45,531 --> 00:12:46,665 You're through the worst of this, 213 00:12:46,899 --> 00:12:48,067 and we're going to get you out of here. 214 00:12:51,036 --> 00:12:54,473 NARRATOR: Lauren Anderson is one of only five survivors. 215 00:12:54,540 --> 00:12:56,108 15 others are killed. 216 00:12:58,711 --> 00:13:03,749 I did break bones in my hand, my clavicle. 217 00:13:03,816 --> 00:13:06,185 Broke my ribs, punctured my lungs. 218 00:13:06,252 --> 00:13:09,288 I had broken and dislocated my back. 219 00:13:09,355 --> 00:13:14,226 Tibia, fibula break in my left leg, bones in my ankle. 220 00:13:18,030 --> 00:13:20,399 NARRATOR: Captain Mike Hillis and first officer Matthew 221 00:13:20,466 --> 00:13:21,934 Sailor are among the dead. 222 00:13:26,972 --> 00:13:29,642 National Transportation Safety Board investigators 223 00:13:29,708 --> 00:13:31,143 are on site by morning. 224 00:13:36,015 --> 00:13:39,418 Anyone finding the data recorders? 225 00:13:39,485 --> 00:13:40,986 Team is still looking. 226 00:13:41,053 --> 00:13:42,488 Weather wasn't great last night. 227 00:13:42,688 --> 00:13:46,325 Well, I'm going to need the pilot's record of icing 228 00:13:46,392 --> 00:13:47,359 and the weather data. 229 00:13:50,129 --> 00:13:52,731 In this particular accident, icing was very 230 00:13:52,798 --> 00:13:55,734 paramount because 3379 was-- 231 00:13:55,801 --> 00:13:58,370 was a second accident for American Eagle. 232 00:13:58,437 --> 00:14:01,674 Just a few weeks past we'd had another Jetstream 233 00:14:01,740 --> 00:14:05,978 involved with icing conditions. 234 00:14:06,045 --> 00:14:08,013 NARRATOR: Was icing the reason flight 235 00:14:08,080 --> 00:14:12,318 3379 failed to make it to the airport just four miles away? 236 00:14:17,423 --> 00:14:18,324 The landing gear's down. 237 00:14:28,968 --> 00:14:31,770 Do we know how the flaps are set? 238 00:14:31,837 --> 00:14:34,273 I'll check with that guy in the cockpit. 239 00:14:34,340 --> 00:14:35,541 Strauch, here. 240 00:14:35,774 --> 00:14:38,377 What can you tell us about the flap selector? 241 00:14:38,444 --> 00:14:42,848 The cockpit section was particularly damaged. 242 00:14:42,915 --> 00:14:44,917 A lot of controls a lot of the instruments 243 00:14:44,984 --> 00:14:46,352 were unable to document. 244 00:14:46,585 --> 00:14:48,153 MAN (OVER THE WALKIE-TALKIE): The flaps selector is 245 00:14:48,220 --> 00:14:50,823 fused in a 20 degree position. 246 00:14:50,889 --> 00:14:52,958 Copy that. 247 00:14:53,025 --> 00:14:55,294 The flap extension was also very interesting, 248 00:14:55,361 --> 00:15:00,332 because it was in the landing configuration. 249 00:15:00,399 --> 00:15:01,400 Thanks very much. 250 00:15:04,236 --> 00:15:05,771 The plane was iced up as they were landing. 251 00:15:05,838 --> 00:15:08,707 I mean, that's trouble. 252 00:15:08,774 --> 00:15:12,645 We had to start making major inquiries into the possibility 253 00:15:12,711 --> 00:15:15,114 of an icing involvement. 254 00:15:15,180 --> 00:15:17,483 These are pilot reports from five other planes 255 00:15:17,549 --> 00:15:18,517 flying into Raleigh. 256 00:15:21,020 --> 00:15:23,222 We do have pilots reporting light icing, 257 00:15:23,289 --> 00:15:27,860 but just trace icing at high altitudes. 258 00:15:27,926 --> 00:15:30,796 NARRATOR: Investigators learned that the other pilots flying 259 00:15:30,863 --> 00:15:32,931 near Raleigh-Durham weren't reporting any 260 00:15:32,998 --> 00:15:35,934 significant issues with icing. 261 00:15:36,001 --> 00:15:39,305 The icing, although it was present in the area, 262 00:15:39,371 --> 00:15:45,778 was absolutely no factor in the accident investigation. 263 00:15:45,844 --> 00:15:48,580 They were all set to land. 264 00:15:48,647 --> 00:15:49,782 So what went wrong? 265 00:15:52,217 --> 00:15:53,519 I mean, they had engine trouble. 266 00:15:56,922 --> 00:15:59,191 The investigators had a major challenge 267 00:15:59,258 --> 00:16:01,593 trying to figure out if one of the engines 268 00:16:01,660 --> 00:16:04,330 had malfunctioned in some way. 269 00:16:04,396 --> 00:16:06,332 Hey, can you bring that blade over here, please? 270 00:16:08,567 --> 00:16:09,401 Thank you. 271 00:16:09,468 --> 00:16:10,402 Thank you, sir. 272 00:16:13,205 --> 00:16:16,241 Now, is this blade from the left propeller? 273 00:16:16,308 --> 00:16:17,242 Yes. 274 00:16:17,309 --> 00:16:19,545 This is from the right propeller. 275 00:16:19,611 --> 00:16:22,881 NARRATOR: The team examines the propellers for an indication 276 00:16:22,948 --> 00:16:25,084 that they were rotating. 277 00:16:25,150 --> 00:16:26,452 Yeah, it was bent. 278 00:16:26,518 --> 00:16:29,488 And look at the damage where it hit. 279 00:16:29,555 --> 00:16:33,992 NARRATOR: The way the blade is damaged provides a clue. 280 00:16:34,059 --> 00:16:37,429 If you've got turning propellers on your airplane, 281 00:16:37,496 --> 00:16:42,701 they tend to grab into things and bend forward as they hit 282 00:16:42,768 --> 00:16:45,404 the debris of trees, and so on. 283 00:16:45,471 --> 00:16:47,906 It appears the engines are rotating at full power. 284 00:16:50,309 --> 00:16:52,611 So he's four miles from the airport. 285 00:16:52,678 --> 00:16:53,879 He's configured to land. 286 00:16:56,782 --> 00:16:58,050 What happened? 287 00:17:00,085 --> 00:17:05,524 As we spent more time on site with the 3379 wreckage, 288 00:17:05,591 --> 00:17:07,626 the questions just kept coming. 289 00:17:07,693 --> 00:17:10,729 It made it very clear that this accident 290 00:17:10,796 --> 00:17:12,398 was going to be a real puzzler. 291 00:17:21,573 --> 00:17:24,576 Were the pilots reporting any problems during their approach? 292 00:17:24,643 --> 00:17:27,446 Let me have a look. 293 00:17:27,513 --> 00:17:30,983 NARRATOR: NTSB investigators hope the pilot's conversations 294 00:17:31,049 --> 00:17:33,919 with air traffic controllers can shed some light 295 00:17:33,986 --> 00:17:37,389 on why flight 3379 crashed before reaching 296 00:17:37,456 --> 00:17:38,724 Raleigh-Durham airport. 297 00:17:41,226 --> 00:17:43,629 They're the last people to talk to the crew, 298 00:17:43,695 --> 00:17:45,798 and we want to know if there was anything 299 00:17:45,864 --> 00:17:49,802 unusual in their conversations. 300 00:17:49,868 --> 00:17:54,740 No, there wasn't anything out of the ordinary. 301 00:17:54,807 --> 00:17:59,211 Eagle fight 3379, reduce to 170, then descend 302 00:17:59,278 --> 00:18:02,448 and maintain 3,000. 303 00:18:02,514 --> 00:18:04,917 NARRATOR: The controller tells investigators that flight 304 00:18:04,983 --> 00:18:10,055 3379's approach seemed routine. 305 00:18:10,122 --> 00:18:11,824 170 then 3,000. 306 00:18:11,890 --> 00:18:15,127 3379. 307 00:18:15,194 --> 00:18:17,896 Was there any conflicting traffic as they were coming in? 308 00:18:17,963 --> 00:18:19,064 Well, yes. 309 00:18:21,633 --> 00:18:24,636 There was a 727 landing right ahead of them. 310 00:18:24,703 --> 00:18:27,172 I warned them about wake turbulence. 311 00:18:27,239 --> 00:18:30,642 Eagle Flight 3379, caution wake turbulence. 312 00:18:30,709 --> 00:18:32,811 You're spacing on a 727. 313 00:18:32,878 --> 00:18:35,781 Turn left one niner zero. 314 00:18:35,848 --> 00:18:38,884 The wake turbulence issue is particularly critical. 315 00:18:38,951 --> 00:18:40,719 This would be a factor that we were 316 00:18:40,786 --> 00:18:41,787 going to have to deal with. 317 00:18:41,854 --> 00:18:42,921 Thank you very much. 318 00:18:42,988 --> 00:18:44,022 Sure. 319 00:18:48,260 --> 00:18:53,065 How fast does a wake vortex descend? 320 00:18:53,131 --> 00:18:56,335 300 feet per minute. 321 00:18:56,401 --> 00:19:00,272 NARRATOR: Investigators compare the flight path of flight 3379 322 00:19:00,339 --> 00:19:03,976 with the estimated path of the wake vortex. 323 00:19:04,042 --> 00:19:06,678 All right, let's see what we got. 324 00:19:09,147 --> 00:19:11,116 NARRATOR: They use recorded radar returns 325 00:19:11,183 --> 00:19:13,485 for both planes and factor in the weather 326 00:19:13,552 --> 00:19:14,987 at the time of the accident. 327 00:19:17,856 --> 00:19:21,627 Looks like flight 3379 missed it. 328 00:19:21,693 --> 00:19:24,897 By more than 600 feet. 329 00:19:24,963 --> 00:19:28,967 The jet stream did not fly through any of those vortexes. 330 00:19:29,034 --> 00:19:31,336 Wake turbulence did not affect the flight 331 00:19:31,403 --> 00:19:33,605 path of the accident aircraft. 332 00:19:36,909 --> 00:19:39,011 NARRATOR: But the radar data reveals that something 333 00:19:39,077 --> 00:19:42,247 happened along the flight path. 334 00:19:42,314 --> 00:19:45,651 Why does he veers off course after missing 335 00:19:45,717 --> 00:19:47,886 the weight vortices? 336 00:19:47,953 --> 00:19:49,555 He's off to the left. 337 00:19:49,621 --> 00:19:51,723 Why? 338 00:19:51,790 --> 00:19:55,460 Why is this aircraft over here to the left 339 00:19:55,527 --> 00:20:00,232 of the final approach path, configured to land? 340 00:20:00,299 --> 00:20:01,466 PILOT (ON RECORDER): OK. 341 00:20:01,767 --> 00:20:04,536 Can you do the descent checklist, please? 342 00:20:04,603 --> 00:20:07,573 NARRATOR: The team turns to the cockpit voice recorder, 343 00:20:07,639 --> 00:20:09,575 hoping they might find an explanation 344 00:20:09,641 --> 00:20:11,243 for the unusual left turn. 345 00:20:13,979 --> 00:20:15,314 We were going to really have to look 346 00:20:15,380 --> 00:20:17,649 at what was going on on the flight deck 347 00:20:17,716 --> 00:20:18,817 with the cockpit crew. 348 00:20:18,884 --> 00:20:19,918 What were they saying? 349 00:20:19,985 --> 00:20:22,054 What were their intentions? 350 00:20:22,120 --> 00:20:25,057 CO-PILOT (ON RECORDER): Altimeter 3031, set, 351 00:20:25,123 --> 00:20:25,991 cross-checked. 352 00:20:26,058 --> 00:20:28,927 Pressurization, set and checked. 353 00:20:28,994 --> 00:20:31,463 Ice protection is on. 354 00:20:31,530 --> 00:20:34,299 NARRATOR: Investigators here the captain and first officer 355 00:20:34,366 --> 00:20:36,969 planning the approach with precision. 356 00:20:37,035 --> 00:20:39,705 PILOT (ON RECORDER): OK, reviewed. 357 00:20:39,771 --> 00:20:40,939 So far so good. 358 00:20:43,141 --> 00:20:45,944 NARRATOR: The flight crew seems to be working in perfect tandem 359 00:20:46,011 --> 00:20:48,914 as flight 3379 approaches the airport. 360 00:20:51,717 --> 00:20:54,119 Why is that ignition light on? 361 00:20:54,186 --> 00:20:57,422 PILOT (ON RECORDER): Did we just have a flame out? 362 00:20:57,489 --> 00:20:59,257 Did he just say flame out? 363 00:20:59,324 --> 00:21:01,393 Play that again. 364 00:21:01,460 --> 00:21:05,163 PILOT (ON RECORDER): Did we just have a flame out? 365 00:21:05,230 --> 00:21:09,201 When the captain talks about the ignition light, that-- 366 00:21:09,267 --> 00:21:11,003 all this-- that came out of nowhere. 367 00:21:14,039 --> 00:21:15,807 We had a flame out. 368 00:21:15,874 --> 00:21:17,142 We lost the left one? 369 00:21:17,209 --> 00:21:18,276 Yeah. 370 00:21:21,146 --> 00:21:23,815 NARRATOR: They discover that the ignition light illuminated 371 00:21:23,882 --> 00:21:25,417 moments before the crash. 372 00:21:28,120 --> 00:21:32,257 This ignition light introduced the thought of a lost engine. 373 00:21:32,324 --> 00:21:35,394 Considering the physical evidence that we'd seen, 374 00:21:35,460 --> 00:21:38,764 this idea was very strange. 375 00:21:38,830 --> 00:21:41,166 You would expect during that period 376 00:21:41,233 --> 00:21:44,736 that there would be some sort of confirmation. 377 00:21:44,803 --> 00:21:49,207 Nothing happened other than absolute quiet. 378 00:21:49,274 --> 00:21:52,878 We needed to try and figure out what was going on. 379 00:21:58,517 --> 00:22:00,085 These are the engine sound waves from when 380 00:22:00,152 --> 00:22:02,954 the ignition light went on. 381 00:22:03,021 --> 00:22:05,223 NARRATOR: Another way for investigators to determine 382 00:22:05,290 --> 00:22:09,061 if the engines were operating is to analyze their sound 383 00:22:09,127 --> 00:22:11,029 on the cockpit voice recording. 384 00:22:11,096 --> 00:22:15,767 This study is attempting to home in on blade passing 385 00:22:15,834 --> 00:22:21,273 frequencies, blade passing meaning all these revolutions 386 00:22:21,339 --> 00:22:22,874 of the propeller. 387 00:22:25,577 --> 00:22:28,780 Call up the comparison. 388 00:22:28,847 --> 00:22:32,350 NARRATOR: They compare the engine sounds from flight 3379 389 00:22:32,417 --> 00:22:37,322 to other engines operating at 100%. 390 00:22:37,389 --> 00:22:40,058 We're looking at the acoustics of the engine performance, 391 00:22:40,125 --> 00:22:42,127 and it's relatively easy to match 392 00:22:42,194 --> 00:22:45,297 that against the acoustics of a working engine. 393 00:22:47,866 --> 00:22:51,169 They're almost identical. 394 00:22:51,236 --> 00:22:53,972 NARRATOR: Investigators hear evidence that both engines 395 00:22:54,039 --> 00:22:55,540 were running at full speed. 396 00:22:57,776 --> 00:23:02,247 The sound analysis told us the sounds generated by the engines 397 00:23:02,314 --> 00:23:04,683 on this aircraft were consistent with two 398 00:23:04,750 --> 00:23:06,952 engines generating power. 399 00:23:07,018 --> 00:23:08,520 The ignition light must have misled 400 00:23:08,587 --> 00:23:11,790 the pilots into believing the left engine flamed out. 401 00:23:11,857 --> 00:23:14,092 But really it hadn't. 402 00:23:17,596 --> 00:23:21,633 This sound analysis put the idea of an engine failure 403 00:23:21,700 --> 00:23:22,801 to bed. 404 00:23:23,034 --> 00:23:25,704 It just wasn't a factor in the accident. 405 00:23:25,771 --> 00:23:28,573 NARRATOR: This discovery leaves investigators puzzled. 406 00:23:31,109 --> 00:23:32,644 Why was that ignition light on if there was 407 00:23:32,711 --> 00:23:33,979 nothing wrong with the engine? 408 00:23:43,755 --> 00:23:45,857 Why's that ignition light on? 409 00:23:45,924 --> 00:23:48,660 Did we just have a flame out? 410 00:23:48,727 --> 00:23:52,063 NARRATOR: Investigators examined Jetstream manuals to determine 411 00:23:52,130 --> 00:23:55,200 why an ignition light would come on even though the plane's 412 00:23:55,267 --> 00:23:57,102 engines were fully operational. 413 00:24:02,073 --> 00:24:03,608 So what activates it? 414 00:24:07,045 --> 00:24:11,116 It's wired to a negative torque system. 415 00:24:11,183 --> 00:24:13,618 NARRATOR: Negative torque occurs when the air loads 416 00:24:13,685 --> 00:24:15,720 on the propellers cause them to drive 417 00:24:15,787 --> 00:24:19,825 the engines instead of the engines driving the propellers. 418 00:24:19,891 --> 00:24:22,961 It can be a sign of a flameout. 419 00:24:23,028 --> 00:24:26,498 This is the same scenario you would have as when you put 420 00:24:26,565 --> 00:24:29,000 your car in low gear going down a hill, 421 00:24:29,067 --> 00:24:32,704 and use the transmission to drag. 422 00:24:32,771 --> 00:24:34,206 It says the ignition light will 423 00:24:34,439 --> 00:24:39,077 activate if they advance the propeller speed too quickly. 424 00:24:39,144 --> 00:24:43,014 There was a situation when you would be at a low power setting 425 00:24:43,081 --> 00:24:47,252 on your torque, and as you go speeds high in preparation 426 00:24:47,319 --> 00:24:52,090 for landing, if you move those speed levers up too quickly, 427 00:24:52,157 --> 00:24:54,359 that could trigger the negative torque 428 00:24:54,426 --> 00:24:56,228 to cause that light to come on. 429 00:24:58,763 --> 00:24:59,898 PILOT (ON RECORDER): Go ahead. 430 00:24:59,965 --> 00:25:02,167 Flaps 10. 431 00:25:02,234 --> 00:25:04,402 NARRATOR: Investigators returned to the CVR 432 00:25:04,469 --> 00:25:10,442 to learn if the pilots mentioned increasing the propeller speed. 433 00:25:10,508 --> 00:25:13,945 Let's go ahead and go speeds high. 434 00:25:14,012 --> 00:25:16,514 NARRATOR: They hear captain Hillis advancing the propellers 435 00:25:16,581 --> 00:25:19,751 to 100% for landing. 436 00:25:19,818 --> 00:25:21,753 PILOT (ON RECORDER): Why's that ignition light on? 437 00:25:25,123 --> 00:25:26,725 There it is. 438 00:25:26,791 --> 00:25:28,760 He advanced the propeller speed, and boom, 439 00:25:28,827 --> 00:25:30,528 the ignition light illuminates. 440 00:25:33,265 --> 00:25:35,333 NARRATOR: The team discovers that the pilots 441 00:25:35,400 --> 00:25:36,935 created negative torque. 442 00:25:39,504 --> 00:25:41,840 Negative torque doesn't necessarily mean 443 00:25:41,907 --> 00:25:43,441 there was an engine failure. 444 00:25:43,508 --> 00:25:47,178 You would get a transient situation for a second or two. 445 00:25:47,245 --> 00:25:50,749 That could trigger that light to come on. 446 00:25:50,815 --> 00:25:53,251 We had a flame out. 447 00:25:53,318 --> 00:25:56,121 He misdiagnoses the situation. 448 00:25:56,187 --> 00:25:58,156 Well, surely he checks his engines RPMs? 449 00:26:00,425 --> 00:26:02,193 CO-PILOT (ON RECORDER): What you want me to do? 450 00:26:02,260 --> 00:26:04,529 Are you going to continue? 451 00:26:04,596 --> 00:26:05,563 OK, yeah. 452 00:26:05,630 --> 00:26:07,499 I'm going to continue. 453 00:26:07,565 --> 00:26:10,502 Just back me up. 454 00:26:10,568 --> 00:26:11,836 He's not even checking to see if there's 455 00:26:11,903 --> 00:26:14,773 an actual engine failure. 456 00:26:14,839 --> 00:26:15,874 Look at your instruments. 457 00:26:15,941 --> 00:26:17,842 Determine whether or not the-- 458 00:26:17,909 --> 00:26:20,378 both engines are generating power. 459 00:26:20,445 --> 00:26:21,613 It's not that hard. 460 00:26:21,680 --> 00:26:23,315 They're trained for that. 461 00:26:23,381 --> 00:26:25,450 If he had, he would have seen the engine power is where 462 00:26:25,517 --> 00:26:27,886 he put it, 100% full power. 463 00:26:31,156 --> 00:26:33,358 If you don't know if you have an engine failure, 464 00:26:33,425 --> 00:26:36,561 but you're responding to a potential engine failure, 465 00:26:36,628 --> 00:26:37,996 that's not very good, and that could 466 00:26:38,063 --> 00:26:40,799 very easily cause an accident. 467 00:26:40,865 --> 00:26:43,635 Let's go missed approach. 468 00:26:43,702 --> 00:26:45,870 NARRATOR: So what actions did the pilots take 469 00:26:45,937 --> 00:26:47,238 during the missed approach? 470 00:26:49,874 --> 00:26:51,476 OK, so how did they configure their plane 471 00:26:51,543 --> 00:26:52,677 for the missed approach? 472 00:26:55,613 --> 00:26:58,216 They set engine power to max. 473 00:26:58,283 --> 00:26:59,217 Set max power. 474 00:27:04,155 --> 00:27:04,956 As they should. 475 00:27:05,023 --> 00:27:06,024 What else? 476 00:27:08,193 --> 00:27:10,729 There's no mention of reducing the flaps to 10 477 00:27:10,795 --> 00:27:12,364 or retracting landing gear. 478 00:27:14,966 --> 00:27:18,937 A go around would be done by informing the other pilot. 479 00:27:19,004 --> 00:27:24,809 Then, apply max power, retract the gear, retract the flaps. 480 00:27:27,078 --> 00:27:29,180 NARRATOR: But the pilot's failure to raise the gear 481 00:27:29,247 --> 00:27:33,818 or retract the flaps doesn't explain the accident. 482 00:27:33,885 --> 00:27:35,653 Hard to believe that configuration caused the pain 483 00:27:35,720 --> 00:27:38,156 to veer to the left and crash. 484 00:27:38,223 --> 00:27:39,924 Well, there's only one way to find out. 485 00:27:46,564 --> 00:27:49,434 There was a necessity to conduct some flight tests, 486 00:27:49,501 --> 00:27:52,303 because we really wanted to figure out what the crew had 487 00:27:52,370 --> 00:27:55,006 introduced in the configuration that 488 00:27:55,073 --> 00:28:00,011 would make the aircraft deviate from this intended flight path. 489 00:28:00,078 --> 00:28:03,014 OK, let's go max power. 490 00:28:03,081 --> 00:28:06,217 NARRATOR: Investigators turned to test pilots for help. 491 00:28:06,284 --> 00:28:09,621 They'll take a Jetstream 3201 to its limits, 492 00:28:09,687 --> 00:28:11,990 to try to solve the mystery. 493 00:28:12,057 --> 00:28:13,925 Sometimes you have to put yourself 494 00:28:13,992 --> 00:28:17,462 in an uncomfortable position, and you know what's going 495 00:28:17,529 --> 00:28:20,098 to happen if you go too far. 496 00:28:20,165 --> 00:28:21,399 Max power. 497 00:28:21,466 --> 00:28:22,967 Flaps to 20. 498 00:28:23,034 --> 00:28:24,502 NARRATOR: They start by duplicating 499 00:28:24,736 --> 00:28:28,373 the configuration the pilots had set for the missed approach. 500 00:28:28,440 --> 00:28:30,608 Flaps 20. 501 00:28:30,675 --> 00:28:33,511 Gear down. 502 00:28:33,578 --> 00:28:34,813 OK. 503 00:28:34,879 --> 00:28:36,014 Gear down. 504 00:28:41,619 --> 00:28:43,488 OK, it's a bit slower than a regular missed approach, 505 00:28:43,555 --> 00:28:44,722 but it's still doable. 506 00:28:46,724 --> 00:28:53,765 NARRATOR: So why did flight 3379 turn to the left and crash? 507 00:28:53,832 --> 00:28:55,200 Let's do the same configuration, 508 00:28:55,400 --> 00:28:58,736 but put max power on the right engine but not the left. 509 00:28:58,803 --> 00:28:59,971 Roger that. 510 00:29:03,541 --> 00:29:06,377 NARRATOR: They try a different configuration in the hope of 511 00:29:06,444 --> 00:29:08,179 recreating the pilot's actions. 512 00:29:10,815 --> 00:29:14,519 Max power, right engine. 513 00:29:14,586 --> 00:29:15,487 Yawing to the left. 514 00:29:22,327 --> 00:29:23,862 I can't climb like this. 515 00:29:30,268 --> 00:29:33,605 NARRATOR: Investigators finally understand how Captain Hillis 516 00:29:33,671 --> 00:29:36,207 executed the missed approach. 517 00:29:36,274 --> 00:29:37,175 Set max power. 518 00:29:39,511 --> 00:29:41,646 NARRATOR: Believing his left engine has failed, 519 00:29:41,713 --> 00:29:45,250 the captain increases power only to the right engine. 520 00:29:49,487 --> 00:29:50,855 Lower the nose. 521 00:29:50,922 --> 00:29:52,023 Lower the nose! 522 00:29:54,392 --> 00:29:56,027 NARRATOR: The imbalance in engine power 523 00:29:56,094 --> 00:29:58,062 robs the plane of the airspeed it 524 00:29:58,129 --> 00:30:02,634 needs to climb out with the gear down and the flaps extended. 525 00:30:09,407 --> 00:30:11,075 The flight test told us that an airplane 526 00:30:11,309 --> 00:30:14,812 with that configuration could not have been flown safely. 527 00:30:14,879 --> 00:30:15,980 It had to crash. 528 00:30:19,184 --> 00:30:21,019 He had that plane configured all wrong. 529 00:30:23,588 --> 00:30:25,757 NARRATOR: Investigators conclude that the captain 530 00:30:25,823 --> 00:30:27,825 didn't configure his plane correctly 531 00:30:27,892 --> 00:30:30,628 for a missed approach. 532 00:30:30,695 --> 00:30:32,664 If the captain thought one of his engines failed, 533 00:30:32,730 --> 00:30:35,099 they should have performed a single-engine missed approach. 534 00:30:38,203 --> 00:30:40,638 Didn't do that either. 535 00:30:40,705 --> 00:30:44,576 So he set himself up for a nearly unflyable airplane. 536 00:30:47,745 --> 00:30:48,546 You got it? 537 00:30:48,613 --> 00:30:50,281 Yeah. 538 00:30:50,348 --> 00:30:52,684 NTSB investigators focus squarely 539 00:30:52,750 --> 00:30:58,723 on the captain of flight 3379, 29-year-old Michael Hillis. 540 00:30:58,790 --> 00:31:02,427 To come across an accident where a response was botched 541 00:31:02,493 --> 00:31:05,830 as poorly as this one, it begs the question, 542 00:31:05,897 --> 00:31:07,832 how did he get there? 543 00:31:14,439 --> 00:31:21,479 He's got 2,294 hours of turboprops, 544 00:31:22,046 --> 00:31:26,484 3,499 total flying hours. 545 00:31:26,551 --> 00:31:29,020 He's young, but he's no rookie. 546 00:31:29,087 --> 00:31:31,222 NARRATOR: NTSB investigators scrutinize 547 00:31:31,289 --> 00:31:36,661 the personnel records of the pilots of flight 3379. 548 00:31:36,728 --> 00:31:39,964 We want to find out the background of the pilots. 549 00:31:40,031 --> 00:31:41,466 Is there anything in their performance that 550 00:31:41,699 --> 00:31:44,269 can reveal something about their performance 551 00:31:44,335 --> 00:31:47,138 on the night of the accident? 552 00:31:47,205 --> 00:31:48,973 NARRATOR: From American Eagle's files, 553 00:31:49,040 --> 00:31:52,210 the team learns that Michael Hillis was licensed to fly 554 00:31:52,277 --> 00:31:55,046 multiple turboprop airplanes. 555 00:31:55,113 --> 00:31:59,917 He starts off training on the Jetstream in March 1991. 556 00:31:59,984 --> 00:32:02,453 We've got single-engine missed approaches today. 557 00:32:02,520 --> 00:32:03,921 Are you ready for that? 558 00:32:03,988 --> 00:32:05,823 Yes, sir. 559 00:32:05,890 --> 00:32:08,092 NARRATOR: Investigators dig deeper into Captain 560 00:32:08,159 --> 00:32:09,527 Hillis' pilot records. 561 00:32:12,430 --> 00:32:13,464 All right. 562 00:32:13,531 --> 00:32:14,699 I am cutting your left engine. 563 00:32:17,669 --> 00:32:20,772 We like to see an airman with airmanship, 564 00:32:20,838 --> 00:32:24,108 so we had to look back at the training information. 565 00:32:27,178 --> 00:32:30,048 Look at this. 566 00:32:30,114 --> 00:32:32,417 Trainer's evaluation. 567 00:32:32,483 --> 00:32:35,219 OK, you're losing airspeed that you're going to need. 568 00:32:35,286 --> 00:32:37,522 How do you get it back? 569 00:32:37,588 --> 00:32:38,756 Not sure. 570 00:32:41,259 --> 00:32:42,727 Now, this is telling. 571 00:32:42,794 --> 00:32:46,097 He's messing up single-engine missed approaches. 572 00:32:46,164 --> 00:32:48,266 It was very obvious that this captain 573 00:32:48,333 --> 00:32:53,705 was having serious troubles with his airmanship development. 574 00:32:53,771 --> 00:32:58,543 Single-engine missed approaches, engine failures. 575 00:32:58,609 --> 00:33:00,578 When is this? 576 00:33:00,645 --> 00:33:02,680 April 1992. 577 00:33:02,747 --> 00:33:05,116 That was two years before the accident. 578 00:33:05,183 --> 00:33:08,319 He had more than enough time to improve. 579 00:33:08,386 --> 00:33:09,487 Well, he must have dug in. 580 00:33:09,721 --> 00:33:12,256 He makes captain a few months later. 581 00:33:12,323 --> 00:33:15,393 By the time pilots become airline pilots, 582 00:33:15,460 --> 00:33:16,661 they're pretty good. 583 00:33:16,894 --> 00:33:19,063 The-- the selection process is so rigorous 584 00:33:19,130 --> 00:33:21,632 that you don't get to be an airline pilot unless you 585 00:33:21,699 --> 00:33:25,636 had considerable capabilities. 586 00:33:25,703 --> 00:33:28,806 That's all I have here. 587 00:33:28,873 --> 00:33:32,510 Will any American Eagle pilots that will talk to us about him? 588 00:33:32,577 --> 00:33:34,612 Let's find out. 589 00:33:34,679 --> 00:33:39,050 NARRATOR: The NTSB wants to know more about Hillis' career. 590 00:33:39,117 --> 00:33:41,052 Usually in the pilot file, there'll 591 00:33:41,119 --> 00:33:43,855 be some little notes about the issues that 592 00:33:43,921 --> 00:33:46,357 have been encountered by other persons 593 00:33:46,424 --> 00:33:49,494 in flying with the captain. 594 00:33:49,560 --> 00:33:51,629 What can you tell me about Mike Hillis? 595 00:33:54,065 --> 00:33:56,801 Well, We're pretty broken up about this. 596 00:33:56,868 --> 00:33:59,003 NARRATOR: Investigators track down American Eagle's 597 00:33:59,070 --> 00:34:01,639 Raleigh-Durham base manager. 598 00:34:01,706 --> 00:34:05,977 Unfortunately, we had a lot of complaints about his flying. 599 00:34:06,043 --> 00:34:09,547 I was really surprised to hear him say that. 600 00:34:09,614 --> 00:34:11,149 Complaints? 601 00:34:11,215 --> 00:34:13,351 From whom? 602 00:34:13,418 --> 00:34:17,155 Several first officers that flew with him out of Raleigh. 603 00:34:17,221 --> 00:34:20,691 Co-pilots were whispering to their colleagues. 604 00:34:20,758 --> 00:34:22,193 It was something not normal. 605 00:34:22,427 --> 00:34:25,463 Well, we had co-pilots that were afraid to fly with him, 606 00:34:25,530 --> 00:34:28,966 and they'd keep a close eye on what he was doing. 607 00:34:29,033 --> 00:34:30,601 Really? 608 00:34:30,668 --> 00:34:34,105 If pilots are afraid to fly with this guy, which 609 00:34:34,172 --> 00:34:37,041 is essentially what the base manager told us, 610 00:34:37,108 --> 00:34:39,710 that's very revealing about the accident. 611 00:34:47,051 --> 00:34:49,620 I hate to say it, but this is a really questionable pilot. 612 00:34:53,491 --> 00:34:57,295 We got a picture of a pilot who could fly OK, 613 00:34:57,361 --> 00:35:00,064 but when he was faced with something unexpected, 614 00:35:00,131 --> 00:35:02,900 his performance would start deteriorating. 615 00:35:06,037 --> 00:35:08,306 How did this guy end up on American Eagle, huh? 616 00:35:08,372 --> 00:35:09,740 Where'd they find him? 617 00:35:09,807 --> 00:35:13,678 His application should be on file. 618 00:35:13,744 --> 00:35:15,546 We tried to get as much information 619 00:35:15,613 --> 00:35:20,585 as we can for a complete pilot's history. 620 00:35:20,651 --> 00:35:23,788 His previous job was with ComAir. 621 00:35:23,855 --> 00:35:25,556 NARRATOR: Captain Hillis applied to work 622 00:35:25,623 --> 00:35:27,925 for American Eagle in October 1990, 623 00:35:27,992 --> 00:35:29,961 while he was flying for another airline. 624 00:35:32,997 --> 00:35:35,032 Find out if they did a background check on this guy. 625 00:35:42,240 --> 00:35:44,275 NARRATOR: When investigators ask American Eagle 626 00:35:44,342 --> 00:35:47,678 about background checks on Mike Hillis, 627 00:35:47,745 --> 00:35:51,249 they're shocked by what they learn. 628 00:35:51,315 --> 00:35:56,921 They did not go back and check with previous employers. 629 00:35:56,988 --> 00:36:00,491 NARRATOR: The NTSB does what American Eagle never did, 630 00:36:00,558 --> 00:36:05,096 they requisition Mike Hillis' file from ComAir. 631 00:36:05,162 --> 00:36:07,999 When we compared his records with ComAir with his records 632 00:36:08,065 --> 00:36:11,235 at American Eagle, they were consistent. 633 00:36:11,302 --> 00:36:15,072 "Moody, unpredictable, gets distracted. 634 00:36:15,139 --> 00:36:20,211 Concerns about tunnel vision in an emergency situation." 635 00:36:20,278 --> 00:36:21,479 Huh. 636 00:36:21,546 --> 00:36:24,982 And he was potentially a dangerous pilot. 637 00:36:25,049 --> 00:36:27,919 "Tunnel vision in an emergency situation." 638 00:36:27,985 --> 00:36:30,087 ComAir could see it. 639 00:36:30,154 --> 00:36:31,355 This guy wanted him fired. 640 00:36:35,793 --> 00:36:38,362 It just keeps getting worse. 641 00:36:38,429 --> 00:36:41,566 I've never encountered before or since a pilot who 642 00:36:41,632 --> 00:36:43,668 was recommended to be terminated because he 643 00:36:43,734 --> 00:36:46,737 was potentially unsafe. 644 00:36:46,804 --> 00:36:51,008 ComAir recommended for dismissal. 645 00:36:51,075 --> 00:36:53,844 Well, did they fire him? 646 00:36:53,911 --> 00:36:56,647 He resigns from ComAir before they can fire him. 647 00:36:56,714 --> 00:37:00,818 That Captain should not have been flying passengers. 648 00:37:00,885 --> 00:37:02,353 Under any circumstances. 649 00:37:05,256 --> 00:37:09,026 Did American Eagle know about this guy's performance history? 650 00:37:09,093 --> 00:37:12,296 It doesn't look like they asked. 651 00:37:12,363 --> 00:37:17,268 There's no record of ComAir providing it to American Eagle. 652 00:37:17,335 --> 00:37:20,371 NARRATOR: But the picture is crystal clear. 653 00:37:20,438 --> 00:37:22,740 Michael Hillis' flying career was blemished 654 00:37:22,807 --> 00:37:27,345 by failed certification tests, bad evaluations from trainers, 655 00:37:27,411 --> 00:37:29,947 and complaints from colleagues that were never 656 00:37:30,014 --> 00:37:32,350 passed on to American Eagle. 657 00:37:32,416 --> 00:37:33,884 One would have to ask themselves, 658 00:37:34,118 --> 00:37:36,721 if you really knew the background of this pilot, 659 00:37:36,787 --> 00:37:40,224 would you put your wife or your child in that aircraft? 660 00:37:40,291 --> 00:37:43,361 And the answer would be no. 661 00:37:43,427 --> 00:37:44,829 NARRATOR: But there were two pilots 662 00:37:44,895 --> 00:37:49,500 in the cockpit of flight 3379. 663 00:37:49,567 --> 00:37:51,335 Lower the nose. 664 00:37:51,402 --> 00:37:53,437 Lower the nose! 665 00:37:53,504 --> 00:37:56,040 In this case, the ability of the first officer 666 00:37:56,107 --> 00:37:59,010 to recognize that the captain's skills were deficient, 667 00:37:59,076 --> 00:38:01,579 it took a long time. 668 00:38:01,646 --> 00:38:04,415 Did the first officer know who he was flying with? 669 00:38:07,952 --> 00:38:09,553 NARRATOR: Here investigators wonder 670 00:38:09,620 --> 00:38:12,623 if First Officer Sailor knew he was teamed 671 00:38:12,690 --> 00:38:14,925 with an unreliable pilot. 672 00:38:21,732 --> 00:38:26,470 First officer Matthew Ian Sailor, 25 years old. 673 00:38:26,537 --> 00:38:31,008 Worked for American Eagle for a year before the crash. 674 00:38:31,075 --> 00:38:33,044 NARRATOR: The NTSB looks into the work 675 00:38:33,110 --> 00:38:37,815 schedules of First Officer Sailor and Captain Hillis. 676 00:38:37,882 --> 00:38:39,617 Had he flown with Hillis before? 677 00:38:44,822 --> 00:38:45,690 No. 678 00:38:45,756 --> 00:38:48,125 Not once. 679 00:38:48,192 --> 00:38:49,894 NARRATOR: They discover the first officer was 680 00:38:49,960 --> 00:38:51,962 new to this particular route. 681 00:38:52,029 --> 00:38:54,865 So was he based out of Raleigh? 682 00:38:54,932 --> 00:38:55,966 No. 683 00:38:56,033 --> 00:38:57,201 He worked out of Miami. 684 00:38:59,870 --> 00:39:02,106 I think it was critical to this accident 685 00:39:02,173 --> 00:39:03,841 that the first officer was from a different base 686 00:39:03,908 --> 00:39:05,076 than the captain. 687 00:39:07,745 --> 00:39:09,180 First officers in Raleigh Durham 688 00:39:09,447 --> 00:39:13,951 knew to keep a close eye on him, but he's out of Miami. 689 00:39:14,018 --> 00:39:16,153 This guy had no idea who he was flying with. 690 00:39:20,558 --> 00:39:23,828 Let's go ahead and go speeds high. 691 00:39:23,894 --> 00:39:26,897 NARRATOR: When First Officer Sailor joins Captain Hillis 692 00:39:26,964 --> 00:39:30,634 in the cockpit on December 13, 1994, 693 00:39:30,701 --> 00:39:35,439 he has no idea what type of pilot he's teamed with. 694 00:39:35,506 --> 00:39:36,974 This pilot should never been a pilot 695 00:39:37,041 --> 00:39:40,444 in command of that aircraft. 696 00:39:40,511 --> 00:39:43,447 NARRATOR: As flight 3379 is on final approach 697 00:39:43,514 --> 00:39:47,318 for Raleigh-Durham, Captain Hillis is caught by surprise. 698 00:39:47,384 --> 00:39:52,156 He misinterprets the elimination of an ignition light. 699 00:39:52,223 --> 00:39:54,759 Why is that ignition light on? 700 00:39:54,825 --> 00:39:56,560 Did we just have a flame out? 701 00:39:56,627 --> 00:40:00,664 I'm not sure what's going on with it. 702 00:40:00,731 --> 00:40:02,299 We had a flame out. 703 00:40:02,366 --> 00:40:05,002 NARRATOR: Captain Hillis doesn't realize that by increasing 704 00:40:05,069 --> 00:40:07,238 the propeller speed too quickly, he 705 00:40:07,304 --> 00:40:10,541 has created a momentary negative torque condition. 706 00:40:10,608 --> 00:40:12,610 He misdiagnosed it as an engine failure 707 00:40:12,676 --> 00:40:15,946 and responded improperly. 708 00:40:16,013 --> 00:40:18,415 I'm going to continue. 709 00:40:18,482 --> 00:40:20,184 NARRATOR: Instead of landing, Hillis 710 00:40:20,251 --> 00:40:22,253 decides to do a go-round. 711 00:40:22,319 --> 00:40:24,588 Let's go missed approach. 712 00:40:24,655 --> 00:40:27,625 Starting with the captain's misdiagnosis of an engine 713 00:40:27,691 --> 00:40:33,030 failure, and his decision to go around, it pretty much was 714 00:40:33,097 --> 00:40:36,267 self-induced engine failure. 715 00:40:36,333 --> 00:40:39,170 NARRATOR: The pilots now face a severe emergency. 716 00:40:41,839 --> 00:40:42,873 The gear was down. 717 00:40:42,940 --> 00:40:44,875 He was trying to climb. 718 00:40:44,942 --> 00:40:47,945 Set max power. 719 00:40:48,012 --> 00:40:51,615 It was impossible in that configuration. 720 00:40:51,682 --> 00:40:54,351 They're basically about to go off the edge of the cliff. 721 00:40:57,221 --> 00:40:58,155 Lower the nose. 722 00:41:00,357 --> 00:41:01,959 NARRATOR: It falls to the first officer 723 00:41:02,026 --> 00:41:04,829 to rectify the captain's mistakes. 724 00:41:04,895 --> 00:41:05,896 Here! 725 00:41:08,499 --> 00:41:11,202 I think he could have saved the airplane, but by the time 726 00:41:11,268 --> 00:41:14,271 he recognized that, it was too late. 727 00:41:26,550 --> 00:41:30,020 NARRATOR: 15 people are killed because of Hillis' errors. 728 00:41:34,491 --> 00:41:36,160 Made every mistake in the book in the last two minutes 729 00:41:36,227 --> 00:41:37,428 of the flight. 730 00:41:42,533 --> 00:41:44,535 I had anger, sure, at that time, 731 00:41:44,602 --> 00:41:49,440 for the pilot and the co-pilot, for the errors that they made. 732 00:41:49,506 --> 00:41:51,909 Ultimately, there was more pointing 733 00:41:51,976 --> 00:41:55,012 fingers to the airline. 734 00:41:55,079 --> 00:41:58,582 Had American Eagle accessed documents about Hillis' past 735 00:41:58,649 --> 00:42:01,986 before they hired him, he might not have been in that cockpit 736 00:42:02,052 --> 00:42:09,193 on December 13, 1994. 737 00:42:10,261 --> 00:42:13,397 The final take away from 3379 is 738 00:42:13,464 --> 00:42:17,301 that we've got to identify those airmen that don't 739 00:42:17,368 --> 00:42:21,505 display airmanship qualities. 740 00:42:21,572 --> 00:42:24,108 NARRATOR: The crash of Flight 3379 741 00:42:24,174 --> 00:42:26,877 reveals deep flaws in the standard hiring 742 00:42:26,944 --> 00:42:29,213 practices of US airlines. 743 00:42:29,280 --> 00:42:32,016 Background information on pilots is almost 744 00:42:32,082 --> 00:42:35,719 never shared between airlines. 745 00:42:35,786 --> 00:42:38,188 If I was to apply for a job somewhere, 746 00:42:38,255 --> 00:42:40,624 they would check my references. 747 00:42:40,691 --> 00:42:42,927 This is a pilot! 748 00:42:42,993 --> 00:42:45,362 Isn't it important that we find out if this person 749 00:42:45,429 --> 00:42:46,697 is competent enough? 750 00:42:49,133 --> 00:42:51,368 We asked for it in '88, '90-- 751 00:42:53,604 --> 00:42:56,674 NARRATOR: Tragically, the case of flight 3379 752 00:42:56,740 --> 00:42:59,243 is not unprecedented. 753 00:42:59,310 --> 00:43:01,679 --and again in '93. 754 00:43:01,745 --> 00:43:03,614 NARRATOR: In three previous accidents, 755 00:43:03,681 --> 00:43:07,318 the NTSB recommended that records from previous employers 756 00:43:07,384 --> 00:43:10,387 be made available to a pilot's current employers. 757 00:43:13,123 --> 00:43:14,224 Fourth time's the charm. 758 00:43:17,361 --> 00:43:19,496 NARRATOR: Now, for the fourth time, 759 00:43:19,563 --> 00:43:21,932 the NTSB recommends that US airlines 760 00:43:21,999 --> 00:43:26,370 conduct better background checks on prospective pilots. 761 00:43:26,437 --> 00:43:30,307 But still, no changes are made to federal regulations. 762 00:43:32,543 --> 00:43:34,678 I felt like I had to do something. 763 00:43:34,745 --> 00:43:38,182 I had to speak for these 15 people that couldn't speak. 764 00:43:41,285 --> 00:43:45,689 And I went and spoke in front of Congress. 765 00:43:45,756 --> 00:43:48,926 NARRATOR: In 1996, two years after the crash, 766 00:43:48,993 --> 00:43:51,762 Congress passes the Pilot's Record Information 767 00:43:51,829 --> 00:43:55,632 Act to ensure airlines have access to previous companies' 768 00:43:55,699 --> 00:43:56,900 pilot records. 769 00:43:57,134 --> 00:44:00,270 The chances of a pilot falling through the cracks, 770 00:44:00,337 --> 00:44:03,007 as this captain did, have been reduced 771 00:44:03,073 --> 00:44:05,576 because of that legislation. 772 00:44:05,642 --> 00:44:07,478 It's unfortunate for that to happen, 773 00:44:07,544 --> 00:44:09,947 but that's what it took.